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Advances in mobile phone technology and the growth of associated networks have been phenomenal over the last decade.
erefore, they have been the focus of much academic research, driven by commercial and end-user demands for increasingly
faster technology.emost recent generation of mobile network technology is the fth generation (5G). 5G networks are expected
to launch across the world by 2020 and to work with existing 3G and 4G technologies to provide extreme speed despite being
limited to wireless technologies. An alternative network, Y-Communication (Y-Comm), proposes to integrate the current wired
and wireless networks, attempting to achieve the main service requirements of 5G by converging the existing networks and
providing an improved service anywhere at any time. Quality of service (QoS), vertical handover, and security are some of the
technical concerns resulting from this heterogeneity. In addition, it is believed that the Y-Comm convergence will have a greater
inuence on security than was the case with the previous long-term evolution (LTE) 4G networks and with future 5G networks.
e purpose of this research is to satisfy the security recommendations for 5G mobile networks. is research provides a policy-
based security management system, ensuring that end-user devices cannot be used as weapons or tools of attack, for example, IP
spoong andman-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks.e results are promising, with a low disconnection rate of less than 4% and 7%.
is shows the system to be robust and reliable.
1. Introduction
5G is the fth-generation cellular network technology, and the
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) has desig-
nated the International Mobile Telecommunications-Ad-
vanced (IMT-Advanced) standard as the global standard for
5G wireless communications. e ITU Radiocommunication
Sector (ITU-R) has specied that 5G must [1]
(i) Provide features such as high mobility
(ii) Be ultrareliable and have ultralow latency (1ms)
(iii) Have a high peak data rate of 10–20GB
Many 5G providers are attempting to build systems that
satisfy these requirements, particularly high speed, but these
lack convergence between wireless and wired networks.
However, Y-Communication (Y-Comm) architecture, de-
veloped at Cambridge University, allows for heterogeneous
networking. It consists of a fast core network and a slower
peripheral network [2].
Our system includes optical networks and peripheral
networks and uses wireless technologies such as 5G [3],
which is the main component of the core network. e
current security weaknesses in 4G have been investigated
thoroughly in [4–6]. However, to date, there are no real
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security provisions for 5G heterogeneous mobile networks.
Y-Comm includes a security solution that uses a multilayer
security system, but research has demonstrated that several
security threats could result in service interruption and the
expropriation of data.
,e research has further demonstrated that current and
new perceived threats to security are intrinsic to 5G tech-
nology [7]. ETH Zurich, the University of Lorraine/INRIA,
and the University of Dundee found that criminals will be able
to intercept 5G communications and steal data due to
multiple security gaps. According to a press release issued by
the group, this is in part because “security goals are under-
speciﬁed” and there is a “lack of precision” [8]. ,erefore, the
security speciﬁcations of 5G heterogeneous networks can be
classiﬁed into two levels; the ﬁrst is associated with mobile
equipment and the secondwith operator networks.Moreover,
a number of mobile equipment security speciﬁcations need to
be considered, such as guaranteeing a device’s integrity,
privacy, and conﬁdentiality; ensuring controlled access to
data; and preventing the mobile equipment from being stolen
or compromised, and the data from then being compromised
or used as a tool for aggression. Authentication and
authorisation on the interface between the network and the
operator have been the main focus of security research carried
out on 5G heterogeneous networks.
,ere is a critical commercial need to create a com-
prehensive security management system for 5G heteroge-
neous networks, and we have therefore developed
(i) A policy-based security management system that
identiﬁes whether a mobile device has been used as
an attacking tool in the Y-Comm environment.,is
follows ITU-T recommendation M.3400 to deal
with security violations in the network.
(ii) A novel intelligent agent (IA) mechanism to detect
malicious behaviour in an end-user device.
(iii) A self-managed cell for the Y-Comm network to
interact with managed objects. ,e self-managed
cell is represented as a policy feedback loop, which is
triggered by the end-user device.
,e rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2
contains background information about the security prob-
lems related to 5G heterogeneous networks, ITU-T rec-
ommendations, and policy-based systems. Section 3 presents
the critical analysis of related work. Section 4 clariﬁes the
Y-Comm framework. In Section 5, we illustrate the results,
and in Section 6, we show the testing performance. Our
conclusions will also be presented in Section 7.
2. Background
,e following section will discuss all related aspects of this
paper, starting with 5G networks and ending with Ponder2
(the second version of Ponder).
2.1. 5G Networks. Information and communication applied
sciences have sparked innovations worldwide. ,e ever-
growing ability to instantly transfer and process facts is
transforming society in many ways, including online
shopping, social interactions, media distribution, e-learning
and m-learning, and audio and video communication. In-
dustry and business have been based primarily on techno-
logical advancements. In attempting to satisfy increasing
user requirements, it is becoming extremely diﬃcult to ig-
nore what is required in next-generation wireless commu-
nications [9].
Next-generation 5G wireless communications face a
challenge in achieving very high data rates, low latency, an
increase in base station capacity, and improved QoS in
comparison to current 4G in attempting to satisfy increasing
user requirement (LTE) networks.
Major industries, researchers, and vendors have de-
termined the key requirements of the next-generation 5G
systems, which are as follows:
(i) Up to 10Gbps data rates in realistic networks (10a
10-fold increase compared with an LTE network)
[7]
(ii) High bandwidth in unit areas compared with 4G
[10]
(iii) A massive number of subscribers to connected
devices in order to realise the imaginative and
prescient Internet of things (IoT) [11]
(iv) 1ms round trip latency—roughly 10 times less than
LTE’s 10ms round trip time;
(v) Wide coverage (“anytime anywhere” con-
nectivity)—5G wireless networks should provide
almost 100% coverage
(vi) Reduction in power consumption by almost 90%
With the abovementioned requirements, wireless in-
dustries, as well as academia and research companies, have
started cooperating regarding the one-of-a-kind aspects of the
5G wireless structure. In 5G, virtually all communication
spectrums can be usedmore eﬃciently and can be categorised
as vertical and horizontal sharing. Vertical sharing refers to
spectrum sharing between users of diﬀerent priority (e.g.,
primary and secondary), that is, unequal rights of spectrum
access. Horizontal sharing is sharing between systems that
have the same priorities; namely, diﬀerent users have equal
access rights. If the users in the spectrum adopt the same
technology, it is called homogenous horizontal sharing;
otherwise, it is called heterogeneous horizontal sharing [12].
2.2. Y-CommArchitecture. A group of researchers from the
Networking Research Group at Middlesex University, the
Computer Laboratory at Cambridge University, Samsung
Research and Deutsche Telekom, introduced the Y-Comm
framework. ,e objective of this framework is to address
new challenges in heterogeneous networks. ,ere are
challenges in many areas, including the network, device, and
application levels. ,e framework maintains a layered ap-
proach and performs as a reference model, as in the Open
Systems Interconnection (OSI) reference model [13]. In this
study, we propose a security management system for the
Y-Comm framework.
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Given that diﬀerent operators will own the future het-
erogeneous networks, new network operators will be able to
join the core network. However, this raises the issue of
interoperability between these diﬀerent operators. ITU-T
addresses this issue, recommending a central management
entity that works as a regulatory authority with the power to
enforce policies in the network and implement service and
network-level agreements to control the entire network.
Y-Comm follows this concept by proposing a core endpoint
to work as an administrative entity to control the peripheral
networks [14]. Our proposed policy-based system enforces
policies in the Y-Comm architecture using this adminis-
trative entity.
Figure 1 shows the structure of the Y-Comm network,
which contains the core endpoint at the top and the pe-
ripheral networks at the bottom. ,e peripheral networks
provide the service to the end users via access routers (ARs).
,e middle level contains domains, with each one repre-
senting a network operator. ,e most important compo-
nents in this research are the central A3C server (CA3C) and
the AR. Other components address other issues in the
network, such as QoS and handover. ,e CA3C server is the
central authentication, authorisation, accounting, and cost
system; it also contains the service-level agreements (SLAs)
and network-level agreements (NLAs). SLAs specify the
terms on which the clients use the service, and NLAs specify
the terms on which the clients access the networks [14]. ,e
AR is the link between the network provider and the end-
user device, and it is responsible for enforcing admission
control decisions. Additionally, the AR acts as the au-
thenticator for network users after receiving permission
from the CA3C server in the core endpoint.
2.3.Analysis ofY-Command5GNetworks. Owing to its open
nature, the 5G infrastructure can be accessed from a range of
external connection points through peer operators, the
Internet, and third-party technologies. All these represent
security vulnerabilities in the system, and, because service
providers use the same core network infrastructure, if a
single provider is under threat, this would aﬀect the whole
network infrastructure [4]. To overcome such threats, the
Y-Comm research group has developed a security system,
although the solutions are not comprehensive. Aiash et al.
focused their research on the security diﬃculties found in 4G
systems. ,eir approach to resolving these diﬃculties in-
volved applying existing security techniques to 4G networks,
as they discovered that existing and new security threats
were intrinsic only to 4G technology. ,ey examined the
idea of applying the authentication and key agreement
(AKA) of 3G to a 4G communication framework using
standard X.805. By doing this, they were able to analyse the
AKA protocol in 4G networks. ,ey consequently discov-
ered a signiﬁcant number of threats to the network’s security
[5]. Moreover, Park et al. discovered that because 5G is an
IP-based and heterogeneous network, a variety of security
threats exist that have the potential to interrupt service and
allow data to be expropriated. In addition, they investigated
and suggested solutions for a number of ongoing open
problems that need to be solved [4].
In a traditional network, security is achieved by not
allowing threats to access network entities. However, in a 5G
open-architecture network, this is ineﬀectual because the
attackers attempt to discover security vulnerabilities in the
operating system, network protocols, and applications, and
by exploiting them, they can develop malware that attacks
and abuses the network. ,e new architecture identiﬁes
possible threats within a 5G network system, including IP
address spooﬁng, user ID theft, theft of service (ToS), denial
of service (DoS), and intrusion attacks. Due to the open
architecture and IP-based environment, 5G heterogeneous
networks are subject to new security threats and inherit
existing threats from the Internet. Given that the network
infrastructure was the property of the service providers and
access to other network equipment was prohibited, these
threats were never present in 3G and 4G networks. In ad-
dition, there is an increase in security threats because of the
diversity of end-user devices and security levels [15]. Ex-
perience relating to Internet protection indicates that pro-
tection needs to incorporate data and entities, which
suggests that the 5G network should preserve both the
entities and infrastructure [4].
An additional security problem arises in mobile com-
munications when an end-user device is disconnected from
the network for any reason, for example, if the device has run
out of battery. Moving from disconnected to connected
status on a mobile device provides an opportunity for an
attacker to simulate a mobile device or a mobile support
station [3]. ,e emergence of root kits, malware capable of
modifying operating system codes and data for malicious
reasons, has made it even more important to protect end-
user devices. According to McAfee, the use of root kits has
increased by 600% over the last few years [16] and the
majority of malware seems to target Android operating
systems [17]. Furthermore, new end-user devices are be-
coming sources of DoS attacks, viruses, and worms, with
smart phones becoming attractive targets. As a result, there
is an increasing number of harmful social implications that
must be addressed. Y-Comm and Hockey have proposed
some security solutions for heterogeneous mobile networks.
However, these solutions do not consider the security of
end-user devices, which are the source of numerous security
weaknesses, and do not meet the security standards of 5G
systems.
2.4. Policy Overview. ,is paper details a policy-based sys-
tem to cover the vulnerabilities in security systems for
heterogeneous networks. ,e convergence between wired
and wireless technologies in 5G heterogeneous networks and
the diversity of network technologies make managing these
networks complex.,e intricacies involved have encouraged
researchers to ﬁnd an appropriate network management
technique. Policy-based management systems have become
promising solutions for controlling such networks.,ere are
various motivations for the recent interest in creating a
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policy-based management system, for example, those in
[18–23]:
(i) It supports the dynamic change of behaviour of the
system without the need to halt. ,is feature suits
heterogeneous network services, which should be
available at all times without sudden stops or
reconﬁguration.
(ii) It requires less human eﬀort to administer the
network. ,is is an attractive characteristic when
managing large-scale networks with diverse net-
work technologies, such as 5G heterogeneous net-
works. ,erefore, it is important to produce a
policy-based system that can also be cost eﬀective
for the end user as well.
(iii) It deﬁnes the behaviour of large-scale networks or
distributed systems. With a signiﬁcant increase in
the number of network users, the number of ap-
plications and services required by end users has
grown and there is a need to deﬁne the rules of using
such services and to control the relationship be-
tween diﬀerent network entities. ,erefore, it is a
diﬃcult task to build a management system. A
policy-based management system can help to deﬁne
policy rules and to enforce them.
(iv) It provides better security. Many network resources
are joined in the core network, and protecting these
resources from abuse is crucial. Authorised users
could abuse these resources if they misuse their
network privileges.
,e following types of policies are used in this study.
2.4.1. Authorisation Polices. Authorisation policies specify
what activities a user can (or cannot) engage in the system.
Positive authorisation policies include policies that allow
users access. Negative authorisation policies prohibit users
from performing actions involving objects in the system
[19]. Note that the use of positive and negative authorisation
policies may cause conﬂicts. However, the policy speciﬁ-
cation language used in this study helps resolve such con-
ﬂicts. We describe these conﬂicts and explain how to deal
with them in the subsequent sections.
2.4.2. Obligation Policies. Obligation policies specify what
the subject in the system must do, if a particular event
occurs. ,us, predeﬁned events trigger the security policies
to execute actions. ,is is the basis of event condition action
(ECA) rules [19]. Obligation policies have numerous ap-
plications, particularly for dealing with security violations.
When a security violation occurs, a set of actions is per-
formed to protect the network. In this study, we used such
policies to deal with a predeﬁned security violation. ,e set
of actions is based on ITU-T recommendations, which are
explained in Section 2.7. ,e policy speciﬁcation language
used in this study is Ponder2 [20], which helps the obligation
policies to work in heterogeneous networks.
2.5. Policy System Selection. ,e variety of features policy
systems such as, Ponder, PDL, XACML, LaSCO, Tower, and
Ponder2 inﬂuenced the choice of an appropriate system for
the working environment in this paper. ,e features and
drawbacks of each policy were considered to determine their
suitability to be part of a security management system for 5G
heterogeneous networks. Although these policy systems
support the main policy types needed for security man-
agement purposes, they mainly aimed to manage large
distributed systems and networks, as in the case of Ponder
and PDL, which are unsuitable for small devices. Ponder2
diﬀers from PDL and Ponder in that it is more ﬂexible and
extensible, which suits environments that contain a variety
of network technologies and operating systems. In addition,
Ponder2 includes PonderTalk, a high-level conﬁguration
language, which ensures that the developer of a policy
system does not need to know low-level details of various
devices. ,is makes Ponder2 an ideal choice for environ-
ments that contain a range of small devices and diﬀerent
network technologies.
Core endpoint
CQoSB CA3C
Peripheral
AR
Peripheral
AR
Peripheral
AR
Peripheral
AR
Peripheral
AR
Peripheral
AR
Domain
DQoSB DCA3C
Domain
DQoSB DCA3C
Domain
DQoSB DCA3C
Figure 1: ,e core endpoint structure with the attached networks.
4 Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing
2.6. Ponder2. ,e Ponder2 policy system is appropriate for
many environments and applications. It supports ﬂexibility
and extensibility, and provides interactivity that allows users
to engage with the managed system. ,e most important
feature of Ponder2 is being able to function with various
software and hardware components and a wide range of
environments, such as local area networks (LANs), wide area
networks (WANs), and distributed systems [20].
According to [24], Ponder2 is implemented as a self-
managed cell (SMC). An SMC is any hardware or software
component capable of performing the required functions
autonomously. SMCs have a self-management feature and
consist of an administrative domain in the managed system.
Ponder2 implements the policy-based system by considering
every part in the managed system as a managed object.
Managed objects can be anything, including sensors,
switches, routers, and end-user devices. ,e concept of
managed objects gives Ponder2 the seamless ability to
maintain the various parts of the managed system and to
utilise these components for management purposes.
Ponder2 supports both authorisation and obligation
policies. Furthermore, an event type in Ponder2 is consid-
ered a managed object. An event type speciﬁes the template
to represent an event. An event is an instance of an event
type and a managed object. ,e managed object sends a
message depending on a timer or the detection of something.
Moreover, Ponder2 follows the concept of domains. Do-
mains in Ponder2 are managed objects that consist of other
managed objects. ,e main purpose of domains is to
maintain policies in an easier manner, particularly for large-
scale systems. ,is is another capability of Ponder2 that
makes it suitable for heterogeneous networks [20].
Ponder2 is a promising policy system, and it has proven
to have multiple applications. It has been used in various
projects at numerous institutions [22, 24] and has been
implemented on diﬀerent devices, including mobile phones,
body sensors, and robots. ,e research projects in which
Ponder2 has been implemented include e-health systems
consisting of on-body wireless sensors [24] and self-man-
agement frameworks for unmanned autonomous vehicles
[25].
2.7. International Telecommunication Union. ,e ITU-R
oﬀers guidelines on how to deal with certain malicious
events and the actions that should be taken to protect
networks. ,e ITU-R clearly explains that security man-
agement should follow a set of procedures after an attack
occurs. We speciﬁed policies in this security management
system based on these recommendations. ,erefore, we
focus on the ITU Telecommunication Standardisation
Sector (ITU-T) recommendation M.3400 in this section.
M.3400 belongs to the telecommunications management
network (TMN) group of recommendations; it provides a
list of security management speciﬁcations for the TMN
management function and states that security management
cannot be disconnected from any telecommunication net-
work but must be considered part of TMN management.
,ere are groups of function sets in security management,
namely, prevention, detection, containment, and recovery
and security administration. We followed the speciﬁcations
of security management throughout the process of designing
and developing our system, and, as noted, there are several
function sets. However, in our work, we investigated and
utilised those best suited to achieving our security speciﬁ-
cation requirements.
We consider accessing a user’s information more
harmful in a Y-Comm network. Stealing user identities is
becoming more of a threat in current and future mobile
networks due to increased user activity on these networks. In
their research study that was part of a Microsoft project
investigating smart phone security, Guo et al. [26] explained
about that stealing the identities of smart phone users. ,e
danger lies in an attacker behaving like a normal user on the
network after stealing the identity of a legitimate user and
possibly harming the network resources. ,is highlights the
need for a security solution as part of the network; to detect
such malicious behaviour and take action to protect the
network resources. In another study, [27] investigated the
security of smart phones and concluded that some malicious
behaviour damages not only the device itself but also net-
work components. ,is situation can worsen when the at-
tacker takes full control of the end-user device, thus
generating a need for a solution incorporated into network
security systems. We believe the increase of user privileges
on the network due to the increasing requirements of ap-
plications increases the risk to the network associated with
identity theft. An attacker who steals a user’s identity may
also attempt other attacks using this identity.
3. Related Work
In this section, we review the security requirements of 5G
networks. Although we attempted to meet security re-
quirements that have not been clearly met in Y-Comm
security systems, the proposed security management system
is extendable to achieve additional security goals. A number
of techniques have been developed in 4G and 5G systems to
improve data rates, including multiple-input multiple-out-
put (MIMO) technology [28], full duplex technology [29],
adaptive beamforming [28], sectorisation antennas [30], and
increased capacity, latency, and QoS. Other techniques have
been developed in association with the new radio access
network (RAN) [30].
Regarding 5G security systems, Zheng et al. [31] explain
that failing to consider devices’ security in the early stage will
increase the security vulnerability of 5G networks. ,ey
introduced ﬁve security requirements. Firstly, the integrity
of the hardware and software of the mobile device should be
protected; secondly, the security system should control
access to the data stored on the mobile device. ,irdly, the
integrity and conﬁdentiality of the data stored or transported
to the network operator should be protected. Fourthly, the
security system should protect the users’ privacy and
identity. Fifthly, the security system should prevent a mobile
device from being abused and used as an attack tool. ,e
ﬁnal requirement is important due to users’ increased
privileges in terms of network resources. In our proposed
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security system, this requirement has been investigated and
met. ,e security requirements of network operators are
explained in detail in [31], and we address these re-
quirements in the discussion of Y-Comm security systems in
Section 2.1 and Section 2.2.
Diﬀerent policy-based system use diﬀerent mechanisms
tomanage the network and to provide a secure environment.
However, as indicated below, the vulnerability of some
related work indicates that the Y-Comm heterogeneous
environment requires an improved approach.
In [32], a policy-based system is used to automatically
manage security policies in a network. ,e system was
designed and developed to reduce human involvement in
network management. ,e system attempts to maintain
security as the network changes, and it reconﬁgures the
network if necessary. ,is is achieved by building an au-
tomatic management system to help the system adminis-
trators enforce policies because of the high number of
changes in the network conﬁgurations and the rapid growth
of network elements. Such growth makes managing the
network diﬃcult. ,e main component in their system is a
policy engine that validates the policies and generates new
conﬁguration settings for network elements when policies
are violated. However, there is a security challenge in this
approach, namely, how to prevent an illegal user from
gaining access to the network after the network is recon-
ﬁgured. ,is technique is not eﬃcient for an environment
such as a Y-Comm network. As explained previously, new
service providers can join the core network in Y-Comm,
which makes it diﬃcult to install a management console for
each network administered. Moreover, installing more
components will increase the cost of providing the services,
which contradicts the security requirements of 5G networks.
In [33], authors presented a real-time transformation of
authorities and dynamic aggregation between dispatched
entities, which also engages with a cloud-based invocation,
automatically leveraging wide levels of self-management
between acting entities. However, the xml-based open
standard is helping multiple actors to specify their intentions
in a static objective way. Yet, the work is not reﬂecting clearly
on critical attacks such as distributed denial-of-service
(DDoS).
Lapiotis et al. [34] extended this approach and proposed
a security management system focused on wireless network
security issues. ,ey presented a policy-based system ar-
chitecture that includes a central policy engine, wireless
domain policy managers, and local monitors. ,eir main
motivation was the widespread use of wireless LAN, which
comes with a signiﬁcant increase in security risks related to
malicious attacks. ,e researchers assumed that malicious
attacks could be initiated by internal network users as well as
external attackers. ,e system proposed by Lapiotis et al.
[34] provides features such as protecting the network from
new security threats without relying on the latest security
mechanisms. However, one question that arises is whether
the detection of abnormal traﬃc is suﬃcient in considering
the demand for a highly open network. Because of the great
demand in highly open heterogeneous networks to provide
satisfactory services, including high-speed connections
anywhere and at any time, their security management
system is not suitable for heterogeneous networks. One of
the limitations is that they do not indicate what kind of
security policies have been enforced nor do they explain the
formal validation of policies. ,is study follows the concept
of the policy engine as the brain of the system but with
numerous modiﬁcations. Furthermore, separating the policy
speciﬁcation from enforcement makes it more dynamic and
eﬃcient in an environment such as a Y-Comm network that
contains a multilayered security service.
In [35], the authors have proposed a security manage-
ment system based on an IP address supported by a spa-
tiotemporal role-based access control (STRBAC) model.
,ey divide a network into policy zones to improve the
eﬃciency of policy enforcement. ,ey addressed the nu-
merous changes in dynamic, volatile wireless environments,
including the increase in malicious attacks and the diversity
of network elements. ,e introduction of policy zones to
represent the location in their model and the role permission
given to the end user to access network resources are based
on these zones. Figure 2 shows the conceptual framework of
the security management system based on policy zones.
,e framework consists of six main components: the
home agent, the foreign agent, the central authentication and
role server, the local role servers, the global policy server, and
the distributed wireless policy zone controllers. ,e local
policy server is responsible for enforcing the policy in zones.
However, the need for a server in each zone increases the cost
and complexity of managing large and diverse networks.
Additionally, the concept of dividing the network into policy
zones is ineﬃcient because legal network users access the
network remotely from outside the controlled policy zones.
Moreover, this approach is not scalable for wide networks or
for when the current network converges with other networks.
,ey assume that the mobile IP is always speciﬁc to a host and
does not change from one location to another. ,is is not
applicable when the network is composed of both wired and
wireless technologies, such as in Y-Comm network.
In [36], the authors have detailed the security challenges
(i.e., end-to-end security, tenant isolation, virtualised se-
curity, and security management) faced by 5G networks,
particularly multitenant NFV/SDN-enabled 5G access net-
works. ,ey have proposed a security architecture as an
extension to the ETSI VNFV architecture consisting of three
main components—a policy-based security management
system, service monitoring and analytics systems, and VSFs
to achieve the desired security functionality. ,e security
policy manager is in charge of providing best action rec-
ommendations by taking events triggered by the service
monitoring and analytics (SMA) function as input.,e SMA
component within the orchestration layer is responsible for
performingmetrics and notiﬁcations acquisition from (i) the
NFVI resources, (ii) the VNFs/VSFs, and (iii) the physical
infrastructure. A virtualised intrusion detection system
(vIDS) or virtualised intrusion prevention system (vIPS)
supported by monitoring and analytics is proposed as a
security service for diﬀerent 5G network services to mitigate
various attacks, such as DoS. However, the cross-layer se-
curity management in 5G is not addressed.
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In [37], the authors have presented an automated SLA-
driven security management framework (SEVM) for 5G
networks and have implemented security services across
multiple layers in 5G networks. ,is enables interaction
between cloud service providers and tenants to detect attacks
and noncompliance with security-related SLAs. Each cloud
service provider has its own SEVM entity with monitoring,
correlation, and remediation capabilities. Data are trans-
ferred between cloud service providers and tenants to im-
plement security mechanisms against cyberattacks,
including DDoS attacks. Events, logs, and correlated data
may be exchanged in both directions based on corre-
sponding security SLAs. ,e SEVM considers the in-
terference between performance and security management
and enables cloud service providers to deploy and conﬁgure
security functions (e.g., ﬁrewalls and intrusion prevention
systems) under strong performance requirements during the
setting up of a service. ,e SEVM is used to automatically
adjust security controls for services during runtime without
violating the performance requirements of IoT applications
in 5G ecosystems. For control and visibility, SEVM provides
security functions (SFs) as a service to tenants, such as
verticals, aimed at monitoring VMs and virtual network
functions (VNFs) in slices and at correlating all relevant
event and log data to detect attacks and anomalies. ,e
SEVM monitors hyphenate SLAs from all tenants, such as
security-related key performance indicators (KPIs), aimed at
mitigating SLA violations before the tenants are aﬀected.
In [15, 31, 38], the authors have investigated 5G networks
and concluded that any future mobile network should meet
the essential security requirements. ,ese requirements may
share characteristics of other ﬁelds in the network or dis-
tributed systems. Based on the above, we propose a security
management policy-based system featuring mobile ID in the
SLA stored in the core server. We enforce policing by using
the current network resources without the need for more
network equipment. Our system will meet the essential se-
curity requirements to provide a secure environment for users
and the network, as we prove in the subsequent sections.
4. Framework Overview
As shown in Figure 3, we propose a management layer based
on the ITU-T M.3400 recommendation for Y-Comm ar-
chitecture. ,e management layer works as a security
management system that is able to detect and contain
predeﬁned security violations in the network and prevent
them from propagating and harming the entire network.
Some detection function sets that met our requirements are
as follows:
(i) ,e customer security alarm function set, deﬁned as
a set that supports access to a security alarm that
indicates security attacks on its portion of the
network and supports the detection of security vi-
olations in the network
(ii) ,e investigation of the ToS function set, deﬁned as
a set that supports the investigation of customers
and internal users whose usage patterns indicate
possible fraud or ToS and that helps recognise at-
tacks on mobile equipment
(iii) ,e software intrusion audit function set, deﬁned as
a set that helps check for signs of software intrusion
in the network and helps detect whether there has
been a violation of the network or the mobile
equipment
,e M.3400 recommendations include containment and
recovery function sets. One example is the exception report
action function set, which supports actions to limit security
breaches and provides some mechanisms. Another example
is the ToS action function set, which helps limit security
breaches by removing users’ access privileges. We built our
policies on these function sets and deﬁned the procedures to
follow if a security violation occurs. ,e procedures for
dealing with security violations in terms of policy-based
systems are explained further in the following sections.
,e security requirements of 5G networks, which are
explained in Section 2.3, state that the end-user device
should be protected from abuse and the security system
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Figure 2: Wireless security management systems [35].
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should prevent a mobile device that is under attack from
being used as an attack tool. ,is requirement has not been
satisﬁed in the Y-Comm architecture and needs to be
addressed, as explained in Section 2.4. ,e opportunity to
attack the network through an end-user device lies in
stealing a user’s network privileges. ,ese privileges include
access to sensitive data, and stealing such data triggers the
security management system. ,e justiﬁcation of consid-
ering this sensitive data is provided in Section 4.2. To detect
such a security violation, we propose an intelligent agent
(IA) in the end-user device. A full explanation of IA
functions is given in subsequent sections.
4.1. Management Layer. ,e management layer is located
vertically along the layers of the Y-Comm architecture. ,e
proposed management layer, shown in Figure 3, is a policy-
based system able to interact with the main components of
Y-Comm. ,e management layer is composed of the se-
curity management system.
4.2. Security Management System. ,e main goal of the
Security Management System is to detect attacks on the end-
user device and to prevent the end-user device being used as
an attacking tool. ,e main components of the system are
the IA, security engine (SE), security administrator and
security database, as illustrated in Figure 4.
,e IA is located in the end-user device that works with
the SE to trigger warnings when a security violation occurs.
,e IA has been designed to follow ITU-T recommendation
M.3400. ,e recommendation suggests that the security
management system should monitor internal users in case of
ToS, as this theft can be committed with the aim of using the
end-user device to attack the network resource. ,us, this
important function set meets a key security requirement of
5G heterogeneous networks, which is to protect the network
by preventing a legal end-user device from becoming an
attack tool.
,e IA has four main functions:
(i) It collects related information in the end-user device
based on the SE’s management policies
(ii) It analyses this information and determines whether
a malicious event occurred
(iii) It prepares a report and saves changes between
previous and collected information
(iv) It sends the report to the SE to make a decision and
apply the appropriate policy
,e SE obtains information from the IA and makes a
decision based on this information. ,is information can
trigger the SE to apply the predeﬁned security policies. In
addition, the SE stores this information in the security
database for future use. ,e SE chooses to apply the ap-
propriate policy based on various factors: the type of attack,
the type of end-user device, possible vulnerabilities in the
same node, and existing records in the database. A signif-
icant threat occurs when an attacker attempts to access
device conﬁguration ﬁles to steal a user’s privileges and
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attack the network. Such a dangerous attack can harm the
network.When the IA detects an attack, the IA warns the SE,
which decides to isolate the end-user device. ,e isolation is
based on the exception report action function set, which is
part of the ITU-T recommendation, as explained in Section
2.7. ,e exception report action states that the security
management system should limit the security breach using
security mechanisms, for example, isolation. ,is action is
taken by interacting with two main components in the
Y-Comm architecture, the CA3C server and the related
access router. ,e NLA is stored on the CA3C server, and
when the SE removes a user’s access privilege, the user
cannot move to or access other network providers in the
network. However, the user remains connected to the
current service provider; therefore, the SE needs to interact
with the access router to deny access and isolate the mali-
cious device.
We designed the proposed architecture to contain a
security administrator (SA) but have not implemented the
SA, and we only explain its function and design factors. We
believe that the SA should be automated for several reasons.
First, changes in the network topology that mimic human
capabilities cannot match the rapid movements in network
management. Second, the functioning environment of
Y-Comm is designed to allow new networks to join and
other networks to extend rapidly [14]. ,ird, the SA needs to
be automated to prevent any malicious attacks after these
changes. Dynamic polices are more eﬃcient and responsive
to changes, as static policies are known to be limited [34].
4.3. Security Management Case Studies. ,is section de-
scribes how the system components interact in the case of a
normal and a malicious event. With a normal event, no
security violation or malicious behaviour occurs in the
network or end-user device. ,erefore, the SE does not need
to take any action. However, when a security violation takes
place, the IA sends a report to the SE, and the SE keeps a
record in the database and executes the appropriate policy,
as illustrated in Figure 5.
An end-user device is connected to the 5G heteroge-
neous Y-Comm network and is able to access network
applications and resources; these sensitive privileges are
stored as conﬁguration ﬁles. Usually, attackers attempt to
access these ﬁles with the aim of using the end-user device as
a cybercrime tool. ,is kind of attack has occurred pre-
viously on GSM and LTE networks [26], and there is a high
probability that it will happen on the 5G heterogeneous
network. Such an attack will have a devastating eﬀect due to
users’ increased network privileges and the openness and
heterogeneity of the proposed network, as explained in
Section 2.3. Our system will provide end-user devices with
an IA to detect malicious behaviour and send a message to
the SE that contains a mobile equipment identiﬁer (MEID),
as well as the attack type, date, and time. ,e SE applies and
enforces the appropriate policies, in this case removing the
users’ access by modifying the NLA and sending a report to
the current domain, which disconnects the end-user device,
thus stopping the designated services. ,e enforcement of
policies takes place at two policy-enforcement points, as
discussed in Section 4.5. After the enforcement of the
policies, the SE maintains a record in the database.
4.4. Policy Enforcement Points. ,e nature of Y-Comm ar-
chitecture, based on integrating wired and wireless networks,
has increased the diﬃculty of applying a new approach to this
architecture.,e securitymanagement system used in a wired
network does not suit wireless networks because of the host’s
dynamic topology and mobility. Furthermore, the open na-
ture of Y-Comm means that new network providers can join
the core network, which leads to the need for systems that can
deal with these new providers at any time. ,erefore, the
system we propose creates managed objects to deal with
components introduced by the new network providers to
enforce policies easily. ,ese managed objects allow com-
ponents to interact with the brain of the system (the SE),
regardless of their conﬁguration details. We chose Ponder2 as
a tool to implement this system because it allows the creation
of managed objects, which makes managing network re-
sources an achievable task regardless of dealing with low-level
equipment speciﬁcations. In addition, to support deployment
of the system, the system creates adaptors using Ponder2.
Adaptors in Ponder2 support deployment by allowing in-
teraction between the heterogeneous components and the
other managed objects in the system.
,e Ponder2 authorisation framework (PAF) provides a
way to enforce authorisation policies that can protect both the
subject and the target [19] and that support negative and
positive authorisation policies. However, this may introduce
policy conﬂict, as discussed in Section 4.6. Figure 6 shows that
two policy enforcement points (PEPs) are enforced in the
Y-Comm architecture. ,e proposed security management
system enforces PEP1 in the core endpoint and speciﬁcally in
CA3C, which contains the NLAs.,eNLAs contain the users’
terms of access to the network services. ,erefore, our system
interacts with NLAs as managed objects to enforce the policy
governing the removal of users’ access to the network. ,is
policy enforcement occurs after a security violation is detected
that may harm the entire network. ,e end-user device needs
to contact the access router, which obtains permission from
the CA3C server in the core endpoint before connecting to the
network. However, when removing a user’s access to the
CA3C server, the end-user device remains connected to the
peripheral network. ,erefore, another PEP is required. ,e
second PEP is in the access router to stop providing the
connection to the end-user device.
4.5. Policy Feedback Loop in the Security Management
System. In this section, we discuss the application of a policy
feedback loop as part of an SMC. When events trigger the
proposed security management system, it analyses these
events and applies the appropriate ECA obligation policy. As
an extension of the obligation policy, the authorisation
policy is forced back on the components of Y-Comm. ,is
loop of interaction between Y-Comm components and the
security management system is known as a policy feedback
loop.
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Figure 7 shows the policy feedback loop. It illustrates the
cycle of interactions between the Y-Comm network com-
ponents and the proposed security management system.,e
Y-Comm components are managed objects, and the ﬁrst
managed object is the end-user device that generated events.
Events are transmitted to the SE through the event bus.
When the SE receives an event, it determines what decision
should be taken based on the event. When the event is
malicious, the system takes action based on the obligation
policies. ,e second half of the loop is to enforce author-
isation polices on managed objects in the Y-Comm network.
,e authorisation policies enforce two PEPs on two man-
aged objects, the AR and CA3C. ,is loop represents the
SMC in the system.
4.6. Resolution of Policy Conﬂict. Policy conﬂict is a common
issue in policy-based systems, but Ponder2 contains features
that resolve this issue when it arises in the network. Policy
conﬂicts arise due to errors or conﬂicting requirements in-
troduced by administrators. Moreover, they occur when two
authorisation policies are in conﬂict with each other, for
example, when one permits an activity and another forbids the
same activity. Additionally, conﬂicts occur when diverse
management functions apply diﬀerent policies to objects in
the system. Ponder2 provides a strategy for resolving policy
conﬂict by dynamically determining which policy takes
precedence. In terms of this strategy, when conﬂict arises
between two policies, the more speciﬁc policy takes
precedence. ,us, when policy p1 for a domain conﬂicts with
policy p2 for a subdomain, p2 takes precedence. In the
Y-Comm structure, if a conﬂict arises between a policy for a
domain, the proposed security management system’s policies
are speciﬁc to a deﬁned end-user device. For example, if a
security violation takes place in the end-user device x, the IA
detects and reports this violation. ,e SE then enforces the
appropriates policy px. ,e policy px takes precedence be-
cause it is more speciﬁc than other polices applied to domains.
,e example shown in Figure 5 illustrates that the policy px
conﬂicts with policy pa. However, the proposed security
management system resolves this conﬂict using features of
Ponder2. ,erefore, in this case px takes precedence. ,is
feature in Ponder2 is useful in the proposed security man-
agement system and meets the security requirements of 5G
heterogeneous networks. Hence, this conﬂict resolution
strategy works during runtime, whichmakes it more dynamic.
4.7. Speciﬁcations of the Security Management System.
,e approach to the proposed Security Management System
is policy-based, and the system acts on two kinds of
policies–obligation policies and authorisation policies.
Obligation policies are speciﬁed in ECA format; thus, pol-
icies are speciﬁed to respond to events related to security
violations. When an event occurs and the condition is true,
action is taken to apply the appropriate policy. ,is in-
tegrates the security management system with the Y-Comm
network. Moreover, we created managed objects for all the
components needed in Y-Comm to ensure interoperability
with the proposed system. Similarly, we created the com-
ponents of the proposed architecture as managed objects to
ensure interoperability and the achievement of the systems
goals. ,ese managed objects are the EUD, DB, AR, NLA,
and the warning managed object.
Algorithm 1 explains how to create an ECA policy and
how the security management system interacts with man-
aged objects. In line (1), the system creates the ECA policy to
check whether there is a security violation detected by the IA
and received as an event.,en, the system receives event line
(2), which contains the attributes of the attack type, EUD ID,
date, and time. ,e condition in Ponder2 is expressed as in
lines (3) and (4). ,e system checks whether the condition is
satisﬁed and then activates the policy. When the ECA policy
Core endpoint
Peripheral Peripheral
Domain Domain
Peripheral Peripheral
PEP1
PEP2
Figure 6: ,e policy enforcement point in the security manage-
ment system.
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Figure 5: Sequence diagram of security management system (no security violation).
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is activated, the actions include four main steps. Firstly, the
system keeps a record in the database and sends the four
attributes to the DB managed object. Secondly, it interacts
with the NLA managed objects and executes the function
of revoking the user’s access. In addition, it sends the EUD
ID to the NLA managed object, as shown in line (7).
,irdly, the system interacts with the AR managed object
to activate the function stop access, which means stop
providing the service to this EUD, and sends the EUD ID.
Fourthly, the system warns the system administrator of the
event through the warning managed object, as shown in
line (9).
Algorithm 2 illustrates the creation of an event received
from the EUD managed object. ,e system loads the events
in the event bus to interoperate with the ECA policy. ,e
system creates the event template ﬁrst and then deﬁnes the
attributes of the event, as indicated in line (1), before
readying the template for loading. ,is step is necessary to
allow the ECA policy to invoke the attributes of events and
check their values when an event occurs. ,ese two algo-
rithms show how the system employs the features of Pon-
der2 to deal with Y-Comm components.
5. Results
After the event generator produces random cases to test the
system’s ability to respond to malicious acts, the system
responds to these events and enforces the required policy.
,e core aspect of the system is how these managed objects
interoperate to achieve the security requirements. Figure 8
shows a snapshot of the system after it responds to a
malicious event.
Figure 8 shows that the system performed the main steps
after detecting the malicious event. It activated the policy to
deny the user access and kept a record containing all details
of the event. ,e system captures details of malicious events
to allow the analysis of these events and the extension of the
system. ,e system creates an output ﬁle to store the details
of malicious events that occur in the network, as illustrated
in Table 1.
As shown in Table 1, the output ﬁle contains details of
the date, time and type of attack. In addition, it contains the
ID of the targeted EUD in case the need arises to collect
further information from the IA in the future.
6. Testing Performance
We simulate our security management system with a focus
on two kind of attacks, IP spooﬁng and MITM attacks,
which target data and control channels in 5G networks.
,e system was simulated using a Mininet emulator for
both attacks. As part of the setup, we considered both light
and dense conﬁguration. Light conﬁguration with 80 nodes
and dense conﬁguration with 400 nodes, also, as a measure
Managed object
(EUD, AR, CA3C)
Event bus
Obligation policies
Actions Decisions
Authorization 
policies
Figure 7: Security management system policy feedback loop.
(1) Policy⟵ (event, condi tion, attackType)
(2) event⟵ eudValue
(3) condition⟵ [: eudID : AttackType : Date : Time]
(4) attackType⟵ “ConfigAccess”
(5) print : “Checking End User Device”
(6) Policyaction⟵ (Record, Remove Access, Stop Access, Warning, ConfigureAccess)
(7) Record⟵ (eudID, Attack Type, Date, Time)
(8) Remove Access⟵ eudID
(9) Stop Access⟵ eudID
(10) Set Warning⟵ true; show
(11) Configure Access⟵Policy
(12) Activate Policy : true
ALGORITHM 1: ECA policy in the security management system.
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of performance, the disconnect rate will be the deciding
indicator. ,is is derived as follows:
r �
nods
100
, (1)
where nods is the disconnect rate in the simulation envi-
ronment. As part of the scenario, the attacker will be able to
eavesdropping on the communication channel. When au-
thentication is granted, the attacker can launch their own
attacks targeting two adjacent nodes from their own device.
To test various scenarios, 0 to 400 attacks were carried out
and the disconnect rate was examined to test the feasibility of
our system. As shown in Figure 9, the simulation results
highlight that the system is robust against IP spooﬁng at-
tacks. Even when the number of attacks increased to 500, the
system showed proper resistance and managed to keep the
disconnect rate fairly low.
As shown in Figure 10, similar to the IP spooﬁng, the
simulation results highlight that MITM attacks are lower
than 4%, showing a good level of response to such threats. In
terms of performance, we can conﬁdently state that the
system fulﬁls the main security needs, such as availability
and reliability.
7. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we present an ITU-T-based Y-Comm security
management network with 5G capabilities that integrates
current wired and wireless networks. ,e main responsibility
is to deliver QoS, vertical handover and heterogeneity without
any major interruption of services. ,e results clearly dem-
onstrate that the proposed security management system can
satisfy security needs in the Y-Comm context. ,e de-
ployment of the proposed system is possible with managed
objects built for all components of Y-Comm using Ponder2.
In addition, the systemwas tested against attacks, for instance,
IP spooﬁng and MITM.,e results are promising, with a low
disconnection rate of less than 4% and 7%. ,is indicates the
system is robust and reliable. ,e future aim is to compute
(1) template⟵ (eudID, attackType, attack Date, attackTime)
(2) maliciousEvent⟵ template
ALGORITHM 2: Event template of the security management system.
Figure 8: Snapshot of the security management system after
detecting a malicious event.
Table 1: Snapshot of security management system after detecting a
malicious event.
EUD ID Attack type Data Time
458X87T88 CONFIGACS 07/07/2019 12:24
359R87598 CONFIGACS 07/07/2019 13:43
287Q9R54Y CONFIGACS 07/07/2019 14:14
E95T1X4W6 IPSPOOF 07/07/2019 14:54
93Q1C4E4L CONFIGACS 08/07/2019 08:21
87W4C27YU IPSPOOF 08/07/2019 10:05
97GKI3213 IPSPOOF 09/07/2019 10:06
96QAZ123D CONFIGACS 09/07/2019 11:31
2DQ76XZ51 CONFIGACS 09/07/2019 13:19
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Figure 9: Performance under IP spooﬁng.
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Figure 10: Performance under MITM.
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wrapping codes for components of the Y-Comm network, so
they are able to interpret PonderTalk messages and complete
tasks for security management purposes to propose a
mechanism that gives isolated end-user devices their privi-
leges back.
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